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. I I •

2122M

4H-

TWO LECTURES

CHECKS TO POPULATION,

THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD,

IN MICHAELMAS TERM 1H32.

THE REV. W. F. LLOYD, M.A.

PR0FXS8OK OF POLITICAL ECONOMY,

'.■•V

FEINTED Br S. COL LING WOOD, FHIHTEK TO TKE UKIVEKBIT1T,
FOB THE AUTHOR.

MDCCCXXXIII

4^4.

INTRODUCTION

A HE following Lectures are publish'
dience to that clause of the Statute ei
this Professorship, which directs, tha
fessor, in each year, shall print and j
Lecture, at the least. They are not
offered to the public as an entire treati
circumstance of their having formed th(
of a course will account (satisfactorily,
for the abruptness of the beginning. \
to the previous Lectures, it may be
mention, that, the most material of '
tions contained in them, related to th<
dity with which an unchecked popi
ceeding naturally in geometrical
would multiply; while the capacity
besides being absolutely confined wit!
tively narrow limits, can be called f<

[ ii ]

service of man, only by slow degrees depending on
the gradual progress of civilization and knowledge.
These propositions being granted, the foundation
is prepared, for the question which forms the sub-
ject of the published Lectures.

For, supposing it established, that the increase
of food cannot be made to keep pace with the na-
tural course of population, it becomes interesting
to consider, by what means the conflict of these
principles may be mitigated, in a manner the most
conducive to happiness, and least productive of mi-
sery to mankind. The equilibrium between food
and population must, in one way or other, be
maintained. Our only alternative lies between
the evils arising from an actual insufficiency of
food on the one hand, or the preventive opera^
tion of human prudence on the other. And to
the latter of these I have principally directed my
inquiry.

LECTURE I.

J PROPOSED to consider, in this
following Lecture, the checks to popi

We have seen that the increase oi
keep pace with the theoretical rate c
population. Since, therefore, food ii
the existence of man, it is obvious, 1
ference to the increase of numbers
sible, the theoretical power of mult
be of little moment, and that, what*
tent, the actual excess of the birt
deaths must be determined accordi
ferior progression of the supply of f<

In considering therefore the con
country in respect of its population
rates of increase to which to direct
viz. first, the theoretical rate, or, ii
as I explained in a former Lecture,
the annual excess of the births abc
which would be possible, and mig

to have a real existence, were the supply of food
abundant, and were no part of the people cramped
in their circumstances: and secondly, the actual
rate of increase, or the annual excess of the births
above the deaths really occurring.

It is necessary, I say, to attend to these two
rates of increase, because the difference between
them is the measure of the amount of existences
repressed, and it is in the mode by which the re-
pression is effected, that the happiness or misery
of every people is essentially involved. The su-
perabundant tendency to increase must of neces-
sity be repressed by some one mode of repression
or another*. So far is absolutely unavoidable. But
there are material differences in the possible modes
of repression, and it is of importance to ascertain
the circumstances, which favour them respectively,
and tend to give the predominance to any one of
them in particular.

The modes of repression are the same as what
have been called the checks to population. It
is obvious that the theoretical rate of increase,

a The consideration of the resource of emigration is at
present waived.

that is, the theoretical excess of the 1:
the deaths, may be reduced to the di
the increase actually possible, in two w :
either by a diminution in the birth
crease in the deaths. Mr. Malthus t ;
tinguishes the checks into two prim i
the preventive, which restrain the m :
actual births, and prevent its being
the theoretical number: and the po i
swell the number of the deaths, and i
beyond the proportion due to the n I
mortality in the human species.

There is reason to believe, as I i
previous Lecture, that the poverty ac
which in many cases operate to the
life, have in other cases the effect c i
fecundity. So far as they produce tfc
they are preventive checks. Proir
course, beyond a certain degree, pre
of children, and therefore belongs :
class. But the most important braj i
ventive check consists in, what is '
Malthus, moral restraint. For an j
its nature, I will read his own desc I

b 2

BMMM^.aMa*. ^^^^ J*

c OK jem cramped

sshmIt. tie actual

i ^ -:

1 1>^»

I is, the theoretical excess of the births above

deaths, may be reduced to the dimeBskm rf

i ncrease actually possible, in two ways, naatdy .

per by a diminution in the births, tr an la.

i in the deaths. Mr. Malthua t
pguishes the checks into two \
Le preventive, which restrain the number of the
ual births, and prevent its bang at great m
he theoretical number : and the paBtrrr. vaira
tvell the number of tbe deaths a&d iscreate then
>eyond the proportion doe to the tatanl law of
nortallty in the human speeiex

There is reason to believe. * 1 "i— H „, m
previous Lecture, that tbe poverty bJ bm Hring.
which in many cases operate to lie datnttioi of
life, have in other cases ik dot rf daunting
fecundity. So far as they pndn Ah htter effect
they are preventive eheeh. Ptmkwb inter-
course, beyond a certain *p», ptmm the birth
of children, and thmfc fc^ to the «me
class. But the moat iMrw hmA of the pre-
ventive check catUBtihvafat h termed hy Mr
Malthus, moral rest*.. Para ^p,^-,,, ()f
its nature, I wfll r^ h. .* de*ripti on of it

" The preventive check," he observes, " as far as
" it is voluntary, is peculiar to man, and arises
" from that distinctive superiority of his reasoning
" faculties, which enables him to calculate distant
" consequences. The checks to the indefinite in-
" crease of plants and irrational animals are all
" either positive, or, if preventive, involuntary. But
" man cannot look around him, and see the distress
" which frequently presses on those who have large
" families ; he cannot contemplate his present pos-
" sessions or earnings, which he now nearly con-
" sumes himself, and calculate the amount of each
" share, when, with very little addition, they must
be divided, perhaps, among seven or eight, with-
out feeling a doubt whether, if he follow the
" bent of his inclinations, he may be able to sup-
" port the offspring which he may probably bring
" into the world. In a state of equality, if such
can exist, this would be the simple question. In
the present state of society other considerations
" occur. Will he not lower his rank in life, and
" be obliged to give up in a great measure his
" former habits ? Does any mode of employment
" present itself by which he may reasonably hope

" to maintain a family? Will he not at any rate
" subject himself to greater difficulties, and more
" severe labour, than in his single state ? Will he
" not be unable to transmit to bis children the
" same advantages of education and improvement
" that he had himself possessed ? Does he even
" feel secure that, should be have a large family,
" his utmost exertions can save them from rags
'* and squalid poverty, and their consequent de-
" gradation in the community? And may he not
" be reduced to the grating necessity of forfeiting
" his independence, and of being obliged to the
" sparing hand of charity for support ?

" These considerations are calculated to pre-
" vent, and certainly do prevent, a great number
" of persons in all civilized nations from pursuing
" the dictate of nature in an early attachment to
" one woman."

This is Mr. Malthus' account of the operation
of that branch of tbe preventive check termed
moral restraint. I now proceed to what he says
about tbe positive checks.

" The positive checks to population are ex-

" tremely various, and include every cause, whe-

B 3

" ther arising from vice or misery, which in any
" degree contributes to shorten the natural dura-
" tion of human life. Under this head, therefore,
" may be enumerated all unwholesome occupa-
" tions, severe labour and exposure to the sea-
sons, extreme poverty, bad nursing of children,
great towns, excesses of all kinds, the whole
" train of common diseases and epidemics, wars,
" plague, and famine."

Now, if We examine the particulars mentioned
by Mr. Malthus, we shall see, that, though they
embrace all the checks arising, either directly or
indirectly, from a want of food, yet they are not
limited to these alone. They go much further,
and include checks which must exist in every
stage of society, as well while an immense ex-
panse of fertile land remains unappropriated, as
when every acre of land in the country has been
cultivated like a garden. In every stage of society
the period of infancy is helpless, and the prospect
of a family must always carry with it the prospect
of some division of a limited command of wealth,
or otherwise of greater difficulties and more severe
labour than in a single state. Wealth is never to

b _J

be had for nothing, and to have to maintain those
who contribute no addition to it, must of course
imply either a deduction from the existing stock,
or a compensation derived either from increased
labour or extraneous sources.

An American, we will suppose, settles in the
woods, marries and has a family/ He clears his
ground, builds his house, plants an orchard, in-
closes his fields. As time rolls on, he acquires ex-
perience, obtains a knowledge of the localities,
finds out the most advantageous channels of trade,
his orchard becomes productive, the cultivation of
his land becomes more easy, he improves his ha-
bitation, every year adds to his comforts, and
eventually he surrounds himself with many of
the conveniences and luxuries of refined life. In a
word, his daily enjoyments depend much more on
accumulation, than on the daily labour of himself
or of his family. His children are brought up par-
ticipating in all these advantages. Thus comfort-
ably situated at home, have they no cause for hesita-
tion, or for an interval of preparation, before they
venture upon marriage? Surely they have, and so
long as man is a reasoning animal, and not only

B 4

8
food but all the conveniences and luxuries of life

are not to be had for nothing, motives for pruden-
tial restraint must present themselves, more or
less imperiously, in every condition of society b .

Again, as to the positive checks. The whole
train of common diseases and epidemics, war and
plague, are contained in the list. But these, as
a whole, are not, either mediately or immedi-
ately, the effects of a deficiency of food. The
cholera, for example, has appeared in America, to
say the least of it, in a form as severe as in Eng-
land ; and though in England it has been most
destructive in the abodes of poverty, yet neither
has it altogether spared the rich. The like may
be said of wars, and other evils which we bring
upon ourselves. They are not universally the re-

b In proportion to the depression consequent upon a change
of life, must be the force of the motives opposed to such
change, though its consequences would not involve any scan-
tiness of the mere means of subsistence. The prevalence of
the preventive check among the middling classes in England
does not depend on a scarcity of mere subsistence, and in
America similar reasons must exist for its prevalence among
all classes elevated above poverty. Were it not that the wild
life of a woodsman offers many attractions, it would actually
prevail there in a much more considerable degree than it does
at present.

suit of a scarcity of the means of subsistence.
Many would, perhaps, be startled on being told,
that they have any thing to do with it. Yet I
think that, on consideration, they would agree with
an observation of Mr. Malthus, that the causes of
war, in their remote ramifications, are not uncon-
nected with it. The late war, for example, was
owing, in a very considerable degree, to the appre-
hension entertained by the aristocracy of the con-
tagion of the French revolution. But they would
have had less ground for apprehension, had the bulk
of the people been easy in their condition. Few
will deny that an easy command of subsistence is
almost a panacea for discontent among the lower
classes.

Suppose that the cases, in which prudential
restraint arises from the fear of a want of sus-
tenance, were clearly distinguishable, by some ma-
nifest token, from those in which it depends on
other motives. Suppose also poverty, by which I
here mean misery produced by want, to have dis-
eases of its own, wars of its own, and other modes
of destruction of its own, all marked by some
specific difference, and never to use any tools, or

instruments of death, not peculiarly appropriated
to its own department. Then the view of the
subject would be comparatively simple, and we
might draw a hard line of distinction between the
different checks, separating them into two classes,
and placing on one side of the line all those mo-
tives, and all those diseases and other causes,
which diminish fecundity or destroy life, and
which arise from a scarcity of the means of sub-
sistence; and on the other, all causes productive
of the same effect, but originating in moral and
physical circumstances totally independent of this
scarcity. Now, though in the natural course of
events, causes appertaining to both of these
classes are commonly intermixed in their opera-
tion, and cannot be disentangled, and though, per-
haps, scarcely a single case of diminished fecundity
or of death, in which poverty is concerned, be the
result of poverty alone, yet these circumstances
constitute no objection to our distinguishing in
imagination the quantities of the effects due to
each description of causes. A line, or the equiva-
lent of a line, parting the quantities of the effects,
must exist in nature, though not visible to the

4 .

eye of the philosopher, and we are at liberty to
reason respecting the quantities placed on each
side of this line in the same manner as if its posi-
tion were actually ascertained.

We shall thus have a third rate of increase, viz.
a theoretical rate, which might be expected to have
a real existence, were not only food always abun-
dant, but also all wars, all diseases, and other
causes in any way tending to diminish fecundity,
or to extinguish human life before the completion of
the natural term of longevity, to be utterly removed.
The three rates will then stand as follows :

First, we shall have a theoretical rate, derived
from the supposition of the absence, not only of a
scarcity of food, but also of all other causes what-
ever, which tend to diminish fecundity, or prema-
turely to weaken or destroy the human frame. Let
us assume this to be such as would double popula-
tion in ten years.

Secondly, we shall have another theoretical rate,
derived from the supposition of the absence only
of a scarcity of food, and not of the other causes
of retardation unconnected with this scarcity.
This is not, like the other, merely an imaginary

case, but one of which examples may be found ;
and according to this rate it has appeared in a
former Lecture that population would probably,
in this country, double itself at the least in thirty-
five years.

Thirdly, there is the actual rate which occurs
in every country under its existing circumstances,
and which, at the present time, and in this country,
is that of a duplication in forty-nine or fifty years.

With respect to these different rates of increase
we may remark, that the first is the most stable of
all, and that though its exact quantity is difficult
to be ascertained, yet, whatever it is, it is nearly
invariable, and, if it can be rightly assumed to give
a rate of duplication in ten years at any particular
time and place, the same assumption will be equally
applicable to all times and places. The second is
much less stable, and oscillates between limits
widely distant, according to the varieties of diffe-
rent countries in respect of climate, and in the
same country at different times, according as it is
cleared, drained, and improved, and according to
the advance of its inhabitants in the knowledge of
medicine, and in their command of the conveniences

of life. Though however not accurately geome-
trical, it yet preserves those main features of a
geometrical progression, which are essential with
regard to practical considerations, viz. that the in-
crease of one period furnishes the power of a
greater increase in the next, and this without any
limit.

The third rate, or the actual progression, is of
course the most variable of all, being influenced by
the greatest variety of causes. It is observable,
that, while the checks, which produce the differ-
ence between the first rate and the second, have
the property of retarding, and of taking away a
part of the original rate of progression, still they
are not connected with any limitation of its range,
and their intensity is not necessarily increased in
consequence of any actual increase of number.
But the checks, which cause the difference be-
tween the second rate and the third, are subject to
variations in intensity dependent on the actual
range. They not only retard, but they limit also.
In short, the difference between the first and se-
cond class of checks, to which I am here alluding,
is, that those of the first class, though they lessen

the rate of progression, yet prescribe no bounds
to the ultimate accumulation of population ; while
those of the second class, i. e. those which deter-
mine the third rate erf increase, not only lessen the
rate of progression, but also confine the amount of
ultimate accumulation.

The remark, therefore, which I made on Mr.
Malthus' enumeration of the checks amounts to this,
that they comprise the whole difference between the
first and third rates, or between the ideal rate of
duplication in ten years and the actual rate, and
not that part only of the difference which depends
on a scarcity of the means of subsistence .

Assume the circumstances of a nation to admit
of a certain rate of advance in its means of sub-
sistence ; then its population will increase at the
same rate, and the whole difference between the
first rate of increase and the third will be a given
quantity. The two classes of checks therefore,
viz those independent of, and those generated by,

c This distinction of these rates of increase (which, it will be

remarked, involves a second independent classification of the

checks) is not introduced merely as a criticism on Mr. Mai-

thus' account, but because it seems to be really useful with a

view to clearness of conception.

a scarcity of the means of subsistence, which by
their combined action produce this difference, must
also be given. In other words, their sum, must re-
main the same, whatever variation may take place
among their parts. Where therefore those inde-
pendent of a scarcity of food are great, those de-
pendent on such scarcity are small. Now, in pro-
portion to the amount of, or rather to the range
for, the checks dependent on a scarcity of the
means of subsistence, is the necessity for moral re-
straint, or the preventive check d . Consequently, as
in unhealthy countries there is little, so in the heal-
thy there is great necessity for moral restraint.

In ancient times war was the great depopulator.
And it stood so far, at least, unconnected with the
want of food, that the prevalence of the preventive
check in any particular nation would not have
operated to diminish its ravages, as it would to
diminish those sufferings which result immediate-
ly from scarcity. We may therefore look on the
wars of ancient times in the same light as an un-

d In what follows, I omit the other branches of the pre-
ventive check, and use die expression synonymously with
moral restraint.

healthy climate, which diminishes the field for the
checks depending directly on want of subsist-
ence, but of which the effects would not be less-
ened by the prevalence of moral restraint. Hence,
considering the importance of a numerous popula-
tion for the great object of national defence, the
maxims of ancient legislators respecting the pro-
priety of encouraging marriage were probably
correct as general rules, and suitable to the times
to which they were applied.

But now, when the invention of gunpowder has
changed the whole art of war, which, partly from
that cause, and partly from the greater humanity
of modern times, has become much less destructive ;
when also from the improvement of medicine, and
of the arts which supply the comforts of life, epi-
demic and other diseases, not depending on want
of food, have abated in violence, the ancient doc-
trine is no longer suitable. The first class of
checks, or, at least, so many belonging to that
class, as are also of a positive description, having
been contracted, a wider sphere is now opened
for those depending on a scarcity of subsistence,
and it has become a matter of importance, instead

of encouraging marriage, rather to discourage it,
and by restraining the number of the births, to
prevent the sickness and misery, arising from a
want of food, which would be otherwise inevit-
able. In our times, therefore, the influence of dif-
ferent institutions and conditions of society, ac-
cording as they are favourable or unfavourable to
the preventive check e , will form an interesting

subject of inquiry.

Systems of equality, with a community of la-
bour and of goods, are highly unfavourable to it.
I begin with these, because, in all the objections
to such systems, a common principle is involved,
the knowledge of which, in its different bearings,
will be useful to us afterwards, when we come to
examine the encouragements to moral restraint,

•To the whole of the preventive check, understood, as I
have used the term, synonymously with moral restraint : not
to that part of it only, which depends on a scarcity of food,
but also to that, of which we see so much in all classes of so-
ciety elevated above poverty, and which results from the ap-
prehension of lesser evils and inconveniences ; the laws of
nature, which require merely an equilibrium between the po-
pulation and the food, being equally satisfied, whatever be
the causes or motives, through the medium of which the ne-
cessary equilibrium is actually produced.

which, under the existing state of things, are offered
to the different classes of society.

Suppose the case of two persons agreeing' to la-
bour jointly, and that the result of their labour is
to be common property. Then, were either of
them, at any time, to increase his exertions beyond
their previous amount, only half of the resulting-
benefit would fall to his share ; were he to relax
them, he would bear only half the loss. If, there-
fore, we may estimate the motives for exertion by
the magnitude of the personal consequences ex-
pected by each individual, these motives would in
this case have only half the force, which they would
have, were each labouring separately for his own
individual benefit. Similarly, in the case of three
partners, they would have only one third of the
force — in the case of four, only one fourth — and in
a multitude, no force whatever. For beyond a
certain point of minuteness, the interest would be
so small as to elude perception, and would obtain
no hold whatever on the human mind.

In this, I have not assumed that the produce of
the labour is to be equally divided, but merely, that
all are equally interested in it, so long as it is un-
known how it will be divided; and, therefore, that

each person will view the future consequences, ex-
pected to result from an increase or relaxation of
his own exertions, in the same light as he would
any other benefit or injury extending indifferently
to the whole community.

Again, suppose two persons to have a common
purse, to which each may freely resort. The or-
dinary source of motives for economy is a foresight
of the diminution in the means of future enjoyment
depending on each act of present expenditure. If
a man takes a guinea out of his own purse, the
remainder, which he can spend afterwards, is di-
minished by a guinea. But not so, if he takes it
from a fund, to which he and another have an
equal right of access. The loss falling upon both,
he spends a guinea with as little consideration as
he would use in spending half a guinea, were the
fund divided. Each determines his expenditure
as if the whole of the joint stock were his own.
Consequently, in a multitude of partners, where
the diminution effected by each separate act of
expenditure is insensible, the motive for economy
entirely vanishes.

It may here be asked, what has this to do with
the preventive check ? It merely serves to illus-

c 2

trate those parts of a cause and of its consequences,
which enter into human motives, and to shew how
the future is struck out of the reckoning*, when
the constitution of society is such as to diffuse the
effects of individual acts throughout the commu-
nity at large, instead of appropriating them to the
individuals, by whom they are respectively com-
mitted. Where the present and the future are
not opposed, of course there can be no question.
I am here, therefore, referring only to cases, such
as those which I have been considering, in which
the endurance of a present pain or inconvenience
will be the cause of a future benefit, or the grati-
fication of a present desire will lead to eventual
evil. Prudence is a selfish virtue; and where the
consequences are to fall on the public, the pru- (

dent man determines his conduct, by the compari- ;

son, of the present pleasure with his share of the '

future ill, and the present sacrifice with his share
of the future benefit. This share, in the multi-
tude of a large society, becomes evanescent ; and
hence, in the absence of any countervailing weight,
the conduct of each person is determined by the
consideration of the present alone. The present
good is chosen ; the present evil is refused. This

is what happens with the brute creation, and thus
the obligation to prudence being placed upon the
society collectively, instead of being distributed to
the individual members, the effect is, that, though
the reasoning faculty is in full force, and each
man can clearly foresee the consequences of his
actions, yet the conduct is the same as if that fa-
culty had no existence.

Now, the objection, drawn from the theory of
population, against such systems of equality, is
this. Marriage is a present good. The difficulties
attending the maintenance of a family are fu-
ture. But in a community of goods, where the
children are maintained at public tables, or where
each family takes according to its necessities out
of the common stock, these difficulties are re-
moved from the individual. They spread them-
selves, and overflow the whole surface of society,
and press equally on every part. All may de-
termine their conduct by the consideration of the
present only. All are at liberty to follow the bent
of their inclinations in an early marriage. But,
as we have already seen, it is impossible to pro-
vide an adequate supply of food for all who can
be born. Hence, supposing the form of the so-
C 8

cicty to remain, the shares of subsistence are con-
tinually diminishing, until all are reduced to ex-
treme distress, and until, ultimately, the further
increase of population is repressed by the undis-
guised check of misery and want.

We may observe, that, supposing the proceed-
ings of all in respect of marriage to be alike, the
aggregate amount of the several shares of pres-
sure accruing to one person by reason of the acts
of all, will be equal to the primary amount of the
pressure distributed to the whole society in con-
sequence of the act of one. Each, therefore, will
feel ill effects, corresponding precisely, in charac-
ter and quantity, with the consequences of his own
conduct. Yet they will not be the identical effects
flowing from that conduct ; but, being a portion of
the accumulated effects resulting from the whole
conduct of the society in general, would, therefore,
still be felt, though the conduct of the individual
should be changed. Thus it is that -the universal
distress fails to suggest to individuals any motive
for moral restraint.

From what has been said, I draw one general
inference, viz. that the simple fact of a country
being, over populous, by which I mean its popula-

tion pressing too closely against the means of sub*
sistence, is not, of itself, sufficient evidence that the
fault lies in the people themselves, or a proof of
the absence of a prudential disposition. The fault
may rest, not with them as individuals, but with
the constitution of the society, of which they form
part.

I do not profess to be here considering generally
the merits of systems of equality, and, therefore, I
shall not stop to inquire, whether any, and what
substitute, for the motive of private interest, can
be suggested, to stimulate exertion, to prevent
waste, and to check the undue increase of popu-
lation. My object, in now referring to them, has
merely been to illustrate the principle of objection
to them, derived from the theory of population —
a principle, which to some may perhaps appear so
plain and self-evident, as not to have required the
notice I have bestowed on it, but which, while it
exists in a considerable degree of force in the pre-
sent condition of the labouring classes in this coun-
try, seems nevertheless, as to its bearing on those
classes, in a great measure to have escaped ob-
servation.
In order to shew the principle in a clear light,

c 4

I will take an abstract case, removing in idea
those adjuncts and modifications, which, in, the
isting state of things, operate to disguise its
tion.

Let us assume, therefore, the imaginary case
of a society, constituted in part as society is at
present constituted in this country, viz. one in
which there shall be a small class of proprietors
of the soil, and a large class of labourers, but
where the power of labouring shall commence
from the moment of birth, and shall afterwards
increase progressively with the necessities of the
different ages up to the period of adolescence. For
example, supposing that to supply the necessities
of a new-born infant, and those of his parent in
the same degree, two shillings and ten shillings a
week are respectively required; I assume, that,
where the parent can manufacture ten yards, the
infant can manufacture two. It must be observed,
that the supposition expresses merely a relation
between the bodily powers of the child and the
adult, and does not involve any assumption re-
specting the absolute power of either to obtain by
labour a competent subsistence. It implies, that,
if the labour of the father be rewarded liberally,

so also will be that of the child ; or, on the other
hand, if the father can earn but little, that the
child also can earn but little. In short, the whole
hypothesis differs only from the actual state of
things in this country in this respect; that, whereas
the discoveries in manufactures seem to render it
possible to turn to account the labour of children
at an earlier age than formerly, and we may ex-
pect that with the progress of discovery it will be
possible to turn it to account at a still earlier age,
I now, for the convenience of argument, assume
the progression to have advanced up to the very
beginning of life. Not that we can believe that it
will ever reach this extreme limit, but because
this assumption serves to simplify the elements of
the reasoning. With the like view to convenience
and simplicity, I shall for the present omit the
class of capitalists. I set aside also the class of
proprietors, and the definite quantity of food
which, in proportion to their numbers, they take,
for their own consumption, out of the general
stock, proposing to attend only to the causes,
which will determine the ratio, between the num-
ber of the labourers, and the remaining portion of
the food.

Id the actual business of life, we commonly find
some labourers out of employment, and more at
one time than at another. So long however as
the whole stock of food is sufficient for the pos-
sible maintenance of all, want of employment does
not arise from an absence of demand for labour
in general. It depends on more partial causes. The
inability of the labourers to change at pleasure the
quality and direction of their capacity to labour,
add to adjust it to the varying tastes and de-
mands of those who hare the food of the country
at their disposal, will prevent some from obtain-
ing employment, whenever such variations may
occur. Another impediment consists in the diffi-
culty of arranging contracts — a difficulty, which is
periodically increased or mitigated by oscillations
in the currency. A third arises out of the
greater trustiness and greater ability to labour of
some than others, while all insist on an equal re-
compense. Abstracting however from all these
disturbing causes, with which I am not now con-
cerned, we may safely lay down the general pro-
position, that the channel of employment can al- -
ways receive as many labourers as can live ; from
which it follows, that employment will be co-

extensive with the ability to labour, and may be
considered simply as an appointed mean, for ob-
taining a ticket entitling the bearer to a propor-
tional share of the general stock of subsistence.

In the case before us, therefore, where the
children are able to labour from the moment
of birth, they can immediately earn their ticket
which is to give them a share; not a definite
share, (containing a precise weight in pounds or
ounces,) but a share determined by the proportion
of the whole number of tickets to the food which
is to be divided. Suppose an unmarried man to
be able to command by his labour, of the general
stock of food, one part out of ten million parts.
If he marries, and has children requiring as much
more, he and his children will command two out
of ten million and one parts. All the privation
therefore, which his family entails on him, con-
sists in the difference between one out of ten mil-
lion, and one out of ten million and one parts.
This difference in a single case is of course im-
perceptible. All the other members of the society
are, however, subjected to the like privation, and
the ten million differences thence arising consti-
tute in fact the new share acquired by his family.

In this case, therefore, as well as under a com-
munity of goods, there is a want of appropriation
to each person of the consequences of his own
conduct. All suffer through the act of one, and
no encouragement to moral restraint is offered to
individuals.

I have here proceeded on the tacit assumption
of the stock of food being a given quantity. That
assumption renders the case a little easier, but it
is evident that it is not essential to the conclusion.
The whole food of a country divided by the sum
of its population, constitutes the share of each
person. Here, the food is the numerator, and the
population the denominator of a fraction. In or-
der that this fraction shall diminish, it is not ne-
cessary that the numerator shall continue sta-
tionary while the denominator increases : it is suffi-
cient that it shall not increase as fast; and this
is the case with food, which, we know, cannot in-
crease as rapidly as an unchecked population.

I have also stated that the channel of employ-
ment can receive as many labourers as can pos-
sibly be maintained. It is to be remarked, how-
ever, that neither is the truth of this proposition
essential to the conclusion. It is sufficient that all

persons, young and old, shall have an equal
cliance of obtaining employment, even though
there be not employment adequate for all. If
there be no established order of succession among
tlie labourers; no claim, that is, to a priority of ad-
mission, and no permanency in the possession of
a, place once obtained in the field of employment;
then, though a man may know that it can contain
no more, yet he will have no reason for expecting
that his children cannot find their way into it.
He will know that by their entrance some will
be cast out, but he will consider this as a chance,
to which all, whether married or unmarried, are
equally liable. Being himself exposed to it, in in-
numerable instances, from the increase of popula-
tion resulting from the marriages of others, he
will not anticipate any sensible increase of danger
to himself, from the competition of his own chil-
dren. Amongst so many, he would reckon it hard,
were he the person, on whom, in a particular
instance, the lot should fall. In short, upon the
supposition of all being able to obtain employ-
ment, the inference is, that the consequences of
the act of one will be equally divided between all :
on the supposition of the field of employment ad-

mining only a certain number, these consequences
fall undivided upon some one uolurJcy person.
But before the drawing of the lottery, since the
chances of all are equal, we must in idea consider
them as divisible. The motives therefore are the
same upon both suppositions, and in botfa cases
the encouragement to moral restraint is equally
wanting.

It will serve to illustrate the subject, if we com-
pare the relation subsisting between the cases of f
two countries, in one of which the constitution of
society is such as to throw the burden of a family '
entirely on the parents, and in the other such that i
the children maintain themselves at a very early )
age, with that subsisting between the parallel
cases of inclosed grounds and commons ; the pa- (
rallel consisting in what regards the degree of
density, in which the countries are peopled, and
the commons are stocked, respectively. Why are
the cattle on a common so puny and stunted ?
Why is the common itself so bare-worn, and crop-
ped so differently from the adjoining inclosures ?
No inequality, in respect of natural or acquired
fertility, will account for the phenomenon. The
difference depends on the difference of the way in

which an increase of stock in the two cases af-
fects the circumstances of the author of the in-
crease. If a person puts more cattle into his own
field, the amount of the subsistence which they
consume is all deducted from that which was at
the command, of his original stock ; and if, before,
there was no more than a sufficiency of pasture,
he reaps no benefit from the additional cattle,
what is gained in one way being lost in another.
But if he puts more cattle on a common, the food
which they consume forms a deduction which is
shared between all the cattle, as well that of
others as his own, in proportion to their number,
and only a small part of it is taken from his own
cattle. In an inclosed pasture, there is a point of
saturation, if I may so call it, (by which, I mean a
barrier depending on considerations of interest,)
beyond which no prudent man will add to his
stock. In a common, also, there is in like manner
a point of saturation. But the position of the
point in the two cases is obviously different. Were
a number of adjoining pastures, already fully
stocked, to be at once thrown open, and converted
into one vast common, the position of the point of

saturation would immediately be changed. The
stock would be increased, and would be made to
press much more forcibly against the means of
subsistence.

Now, the field for the employment of labour is
in fact a common, the pasture of which is free to
all, to the born and to the unborn, to the present
tenants of the earth and to all who are waiting
for admission. In the common for cattle, the
young animal begins an independent participation
in the produce, by the possession of a set of teeth
and the ability to graze. In the common for man,
the child begins a similar participation, by the
possession of a pair of hands competent to labour.
The tickets for admission being so readily pro-
curable, it cannot happen otherwise, than that the
commons, in both cases, must be constantly stocked
to the extreme point of saturation.

It appears then, that, neither in the actual con-
dition of the labouring classes, nor under a system
of equality with a community of labour and of
goods, when the increase in the resources of the
society is so slow as to require prudence in re-
ference to marriage, is the obligation to such pru-

dence sufficiently divided and appropriated. In
neither case, if individuals are prudent, do they
alone reap the benefit, nor, if they are imprudent,
do they alone feel the evil consequences. The
helplessness of the first few years of life ope-
rates indeed, to a certain degree, as a weight in fa-
vour of individual prudence. But this is not
enough. It ought to be an adequate weight. No-
body would maintain, that, were the helplessness
to continue only for nine or ten days, or for nine
or ten weeks, or for nine or ten months, it would
offer a sufficient incentive to abstinence. Why
then should there be any peculiar virtue in nine
or ten years ? If the pressure of a family during
that period is disregarded, the public is not saved
from the subsequent inconvenience. It does not
follow, that, because the children are able to main-
tain themselves, as it is called, or, in other words,
to purchase by their labour their daily bread, no-
body else is the worse for their being brought
into the world. Were this a just inference, it
would be equally just could they work for their
living from the moment of birth, as under the ab-
stract hypothesis. I shall return to this subject
in the next Lecture.

►

LECTURE II.

Mr. MALTHUS, in treating of the effects

which would result to society from the prevalence
of moral restraint, infers, that u if it were generally
" adopted, by lowering the supply of labour in
" the market, it would, in the natural course of
" things, soon raise its price." And we may rea-
dily allow, that, abstinence from marriage, if ge-
nerally and almost universally prevalent, would
have this effect. But, if the principles laid down
in the last Lecture be correct, it is idle to ima-
gine, that, among labourers who have only the
sale of their labour on which to depend for their
maintenance, such abstinence can ever generally
prevail; and this for the simple reason, that,
against it, there are the natural passions which
prompt to marriage, and the substantial benefits
derivable from marriage ; while, in favour of it, to
oppose these, there is no adequate individual be-
nefit to be derived from abstinence.

For, for the sake of argument, suppose it to
prevail, and, by consequence, that the money wages
of labour will command a considerable quantity
of food. All labourers, therefore, without distinc-
tion, have apparently a greater power of main-
taining with decency a large family. If all con-
tinue to abstain, they will retain this power. But
here I ask, what is there to hinder individuals,
who do not enter into the common feeling, from
taking advantage of the general forbearance?
What rule of prudence would they violate by do-
ing so? Would they lower their rank in life?
Would they be unable to transmit to their chil-
dren the same advantages which they had them-
selves possessed ? They might indeed have for a
few years to deny themselves a few luxuries of
dress or furniture, or otherwise, possibly, to sub-
mit to harder work and harder fare in order to
retain them. But these inconveniences could not
be sufficient, in the judgment even of the most
prudent person, to counterbalance the real ad-
vantages of a wife and family, and to induce the
preference of a life of celibacy. Neither would
they furnish any material grounds for delay ; since,
DS

among labourers, the natural age for
coinciding nearly with the time when their in-
come is the greatest, and when, being in the vi-
gour of their health and strength, they are best
able to endure privations, and, if necessary, to in-
crease their exertions, no future opportunity -would
appear more favourable than the present. The
wages of labour being by the hypothesis faigh,
about the maintenance of his family the labourer
would have nothing to fear. His individual act
could produce no sensible effect on the market of
labour, and he might therefore justly expect his
children to have the same advantages which. lie
had himself possessed.

Dr. Chalmers follows in the track of Mr. Mal-
thus, and assumes, that by the operation of the
moral preventive check, we may hope to see
WHgvw kept permanently high. And this effect he
proposes to produce, through the means " both of
" common and Christian education e ." It is also
to be the immediate fruit, " not of any external or

* " By elevating their standanf of enjoyment through the
" mean* both of common and Christian education." Chal-
mm't Pol. Jfron. p. .1.14.

■

" authoritative compulsion, but of the sponta-
" neous and collective will of the working classes
" of society*?'

Let us examine this question by reference to a
case, which, though not exactly similar, is yet suf-
ficiently so for the present purpose. Were unani-
mity essential to the enactment of every law, and,
not only to its enactment, but also to its continu-
ance, there would evidently be great difficulties in
the way of government. Could we entertain the
hope of removing these difficulties by means of
education ? And in like manner I would ask, will
education produce unanimity among the working
classes of society? And, if it will not, how can
effect be given to their collective will, without
authoritative compulsion to coerce a dissentient
minority? How can we expect that some will
abstain from marriage, when others may step in
to take advantage of their abstinence ?

The fact is, that the wages of the lowest de-
scription of labour, in every old country where
competition has been tolerably free, have always
bordered on the minimum necessary for main-
tenance. It was an observation of Swift, a hun-
f P. 552.
D 3

dred yean ago, that there were few countries in
which one third of the people were not extremely
stinted even in the necessaries of life ; and* were
the point doubtful, similar remarks, applicable to
almost every period of history, might be gleaned
from other writers. We may also expect tiiexn to
remain at least equally applicable in future, un-
less some improvement shall take place in the
structure of society, which shall furnish hopes of
an advancement in station, leaving less to chance,
and, at the same time, producing a degree of isola-
tion, by which the consequences, whether good or
evil, flowing from the actions of individuals, may
be more fully appropriated to the authors of them.
Such an improvement, however, could not ope-
rate through the medium of high wages. Even in
past times, when competition was much restricted,
and, owing to the difficulty of communication, the
field for the employment of labour did not consist
of one vast common as at present, but rather of
many little commons distinct from each other, and
when, by consequence, a fountain of imprudence in
one part, could not so readily overflow, and spread
misery equally amongst all, still, in every part,
there were enough at the bottom of the scale to

keep down the wages of common labour. Much
more must this be the case, when, by the change
of circumstances, all barriers have been broken
down, and the communication is free throughout
England, Scotland, and Ireland.

Fifty years ago, it was contended by those who
advocated the propriety of throwing small farms
together, that, by the increase of products which
would follow from better husbandry, wages would
be raised, and that the husbandman, in his new
capacity of a labourer, would, by reason of the
high wages, be better off than in his ancient capa-
city of a small farmer. Those, who argued thus,
did not perceive, that the benefit on which they
laid so much stress, could not by possibility be
permanent. They proceeded rashly on the tacit
assumption of population being a given quantity.
They did not observe, that, in his condition of a
small farmer, the husbandman had a degree of
isolation, while, in his condition of a labourer, he
would have no source of subsistence on which
others could not encroachs.

B Were the competition as free between the occupiers of

land, as between the purchasers of food in the market, there

D 4

The effects deduced from the abstract hypothe-
sis, which I considered in the last Lecture, of chil-
dren being able to labour from the moment; of
birth, correspond much more nearly with the
isting condition of the labouring classes, than,
comparison of the data of that hypothesis with
their actual powers, a first view would lead us to
expect. The natural helplessness of the first years
of infancy is a weight in favour of prudential mo-
tives, which operates in a certain degree to oppose
the consequences resulting from the theory. But
then again, on the other hand, there are counter-
vailing circumstances, in the actual condition of so-

would be no greater degree of isolation in the condition of a
small farmer than in that of a labourer. But it cannot be as
free, in the case of the former, as in that of the latter. Mr.
Babbage, in his late work on the Economy of Machinery and
Manufactures, has added a new element to the previously
known elements of price. This is the cost of verification, as
he terms it, or, (what it amounts to in other words,) a payment
for confidence. On account of the difficulties which would at-
tend the enforcing a hard bargain with a tenant, and the in-
conveniences which would arise from a frequent change of
tenants, this element enters very largely into almost every bar-
gain about the letting of land. I have here inverted the com-
mon order of the terms, and considered the use of the land
the price, and the rent the thing purchased.

ciety, tending to neutralize its effects, which had
no place under the hypothesis. The chief of these
is the uncertainty of employment.

The failure of employment in one quarter, diverts
the command of the means of subsistence, and
causes it to flow more strongly in another channel.
Consequently, the more fortunate labourers who
retain their employment, can purchase, by their la-
bour, an amount of subsistence, which the propor-
tion between the whole population and the food of
the country could not afford to all, were all em-
ployed. Thus, while the world is already full, a
false signal is held out, and the same encourage-
ment to marriage is offered, which would be of-
fered by the legitimate encouragements, a vacancy
by death, or an actual increase in the sum total of
subsistence.

It cannot be justly argued, that the uncertainty
of employment ought to be foreseen and provided
for. The extent of the measures necessary to ob-
viate it cannot be foreseen, and we cannot expect
that those who are in actual employment should ■
refrain from marrying, on account of the obscure
anticipation of a danger which is not near, which

may perhaps never be realized, or which, on the
contrary, may fall on them with such force, as ut-
terly to overwhelm them, notwithstanding their
best precautions. The business of life must pro-
ceed in spite of its uncertainties. The mariner,
going a long voyage, has scope for the exercise of
his discretion in choosing the moment of his de-
parture, but, as to the rest, he must commit him-
self to the chances of the winds and waves.

The failure of employment, were it simply peri-
odica], that is, were it to recur at known intervals,
and to continue during periods of known duration,
though its effects would be much mitigated, yet
even thus, would offer a great obstruction to the
preventive check. The term during which the
constitution of society charges the labouring classes
with the maintenance of their families, is pre-
cisely analogous with that during which nature
charges the birds and beasts with the maintenance
of theirs. In both cases, the term is fixed, merely
by the time required for the development of the
physical strength. Supposing the birds to pos-
sess the faculties of reason and speech, as in the
times of which Msop treats, let us consider the

motives for moral restraint which their circum-
stances would then suggest. The peculiarity of
their condition consists in the great expansion of
their means of subsistence, which occurs in the
time of spring and summer, and its subsequent
contraction in winter. Hence, after each annual
reduction of their numbers, the survivors, upon
the return of the season, have abundant means for
maintaining a family. Where then are we to look
for motives for moral restraint ? In the chance
of starvation in the winter ? But this chance will
not be sensibly varied whether they refrain or not.
They possess the means of subsistence in common,
and before winter the helplessness of the first pe-
riod of life having passed, each family can then
take in proportion to its number out of the com-
mon stock. In the same manner, a labourer ob-
taining good employment, with a prospect of its
continuance during ten or twelve years, may marry
upon that prospect without violating the rules of
prudence.

It may be said indeed, that, instead of extrava-
gantly squandering his temporary income in the
maintenance of afamily,he might save it for himself

against the evil day when employment should fail.
It is questionable however whether this is practi-
cable to any great extent. The benefit of saving
depends in a material degree on its being partial.
'Were all to make the attempt, they would, proba-
bly, by their competition, counteract each other's
expectations of advantage. In a season of scar-
city the least resolute would draw upon their
hoards, and, by enhancing the price of provisions,
would compel others to do the same. And, though
this would tend to equalize the supply of food
through a series of years, it would only have the
tendency, without fully producing the effect. At
any rate, to expect labourers thus to save, would
be to make an additional call upon their prudence;
and we may remark generally, that, in proportion
to the intricacies of the path of life, there will be a
certain number of failures, notwithstanding that
they may be in some degree mitigated by means of
expedients. The expedients are themselves a new
subject of attention, which is liable to disorder, and
can never afford a remedy, equal to that of ren-
dering the path of life more simple, by removing
the evil which occasions the necessity for them.

To suppose, however, that the failure of employ-
ment is periodical, or, in other words, that the dif-
ficulties of life can be foreseen, would be a conces-
sion in favour of the existing state of things far
greater than the true nature of the case will war-
rant. There is in fact a vast degree of uncertainty
in the prospects of a labouring man, and the na-
tural consequence is, as I have already intimated,
that he must act at random. All the same ele-
ments and principles, which are commonly con-
sidered essential to the efficacy of punishment, are
applicable here. Of these, certainty has always
been accounted the chief. In proportion as punish-
ments are uncertain, they will be little regarded,
and particularly so when even innocence consti-
tutes no security. In the case of the preventive
check, not only is the punishment uncertain, but,
what is equally pernicious, there is the like un-
certainty as to the character of the offence. Mar-
riage cannot be put even in analogy with crime,
except sub modo. It cannot, like crime, be simply
and without exception reprobated. And where
much depends on chance, there must of course be
many cases of actual failure, in which it may be

justly alleged, that the measure was prudent,
but the event unlucky : and it would be difficult,
to distinguish from the rest, those cases in which
the like excuse might not be urged with equal
justice.

It is convenient, here, to distinguish between
the motives and the disposition to prudence. By
the motives, I mean circumstances external to the
minds of the individuals, operating from without
upon the reasoning faculty, and furnishing the
considerations and grounds upon which they de-
termine to be prudent. By the disposition, I mean
something internal to the mind itself, namely, the
strength of the reasoning faculty, combined with
the degree of self-command possessed by the indi-
viduals, and their consequent sensibility to pru-
dential considerations. Supposing now a necessity
for a limitation of the number of births, that is,
for the preventive check, to exist, it is evident
that the dictates of this necessity will be attended
to, in proportion, jointly to the motives for pru-
dence which the constitution of the society sug-
gests to the individuals composing it, and to their
sensibility to prudential considerations. The mo-

tives, as we have seen, depend materially on the
manner in which the constitution of the society is
regulated, and on the degree of pressure which a
family entails on the parents. The disposition,
which depends on the reasoning faculty, will vary
according as that faculty is improved by educa-
tion and experience.

I have hitherto confined myself chiefly to the
consideration of the motives to prudence, in the la-
bouring class. The disposition to prudence, in the
same class, naturally occurs next in the order of
reasoning. I will, however, only now remark, that
constant labour at an early age precludes the pos-
sibility of effective education. The other points
belonging to this head will be sufficiently illus-
trated in the course of the subsequent investiga-
tion, and it is unnecessary to constitute them a dis-
tinct subject of inquiry.

The abstract hypothesis, which I considered in
the last Lecture, was in every respect unfavour-
able to the preventive check. I will now proceed
to one which will be in many respects favourable
to it.

Let us retain the supposition of a society con-

stituted as society is at present constituted in this
country, that is, with a small class of proprietors
of the soil and a large class of persons with no
source of income besides their labour; but instead
of supposing the power of labouring to commence
from the moment of birth, as in the former case,
let us now suppose its commencement to be de-
ferred until the age of eight or ten, and instead of
its remaining nearly stationary from the period of
adolescence, let us further suppose that it shall
continue increasing with the advance of age, until
the very termination of life. According to this
supposition, the earnings of a child eight or ten
years of age might perhaps be one or two shillings
a week. At the age of twenty they might have
increased to eight or ten shillings. We may take
them as twenty or twenty-four shillings at forty,
and as two or three pounds at seventy. Con-
sequently this case differs from the existing state
of things, in what regards the labouring classes,
much more materially than the last.

Now it is evident that, upon this supposition,
all the pressure arising from a scarcity of food,
would fall in the first instance on the junior mem-

bers of the society. It could never touch the old,
except through the medium of those who might
be dependent on them. Were all to act inde-
pendently of each other, and to draw, each on his
own resources only, in the competition between
the purchasers of food the young would have no
chance. Their competition would soon cease by the
failure of their means. The old could alone pur-
chase a sufficiency, and what the young would
want, besides their earnings, to complete the
amount of their necessary sustenance, they could
obtain only through the favour of the old. Hence,
they would generally be in a state of dependence
on the old, and from this dependence many ad-
vantages would arise.

The manner in which this dependence would
be produced may be thus traced. Let us begin
from the present and actual state of the labouring
classes, in what regards the proportions of the
money wages of the different ages. Then, were
the money wages of all to be alike increased, the
price of food would be increased in the same pro-
portion. For example, were the wages to be
doubled, the prices of food would be also doubled.

But were the transition, from the present state of
things to the state assumed in the hypothesis, to be
effected by a series of additions to the wages of all,
increasing according to their age, and consequently
leaving the wages of the young nearly unchanged,
while those of the old would be greatly increased,
the effect on the price of food would not shew it-
self to the same extent : in other words, the rise
of price would not be equal to the average addi-
tion to the wages. There would however be a
rise, and that not an inconsiderable one, and it
would be effected by the following process. In
the first place, many of those receiving an addition
to their income would devote a part of it to the
purchase of more food for themselves, and would
consequently occasion a rise of price. For every
additional sum, devoted to the purchase of a com-
modity, limited in quantity as food is, must cause
a rise of price, since one cannot increase his own
consumption without diminishing the remainder
which is . to be consumed by others. Secondly,
they would devote a further portion of it to the
purchase of food for the benefit of their families. I
do not here mean, merely infant families, but chil-

dren commonly maintaining themselves, though
not earning a maintenance as ample as they could
wish. This would in like manner cause a further
addition to the price, and these additions would
necessarily produce the dependence I mentioned.
For the earnings of the young, of which the no-
minal amount would remain nearly the same,
would become incompetent to their maintenance
under the advanced prices.

It is difficult to determine what limit should be
assigned to the rise of the price of food in this
form of society. The increase of means being ac-
cumulated with the old, the position of the limit
would practically depend on the average amount
of the pecuniary assistance which they would de-
vote to the assistance of the young. It is reason-
able to assume that this would be generally con-
fined to the sum, which, in combination with the
earnings of these, would be sufficient for their
maintenance while they should remain unmarried.
Beyond this point it is probable that most pa-
rents would be unwilling to continue their assist-
ance. They would hesitate at the prospect of an
indefinite charge, and, at the most, the assistance

£ 2

thfey would give would not be likely to exceed a
limited maximum. Hence it is probable, that pa-
rents would in general be much opposed to the
marriage of their children, unless they could see
sufficient grounds for expecting, that, by their own
exertions, and from their own resources alone,
they would be able to maintain a family.

Now the benefits which would result from this
state of things are these :

First, the objections, which apply to a com-
munity of goods, and to the case where the chil-
dren can maintain themselves at a very early age,
would not be applicable here. The additions
which a young family could make to the income
of the parents would be inconsiderable, and their
maintenance would chiefly be derived from the
subdivision of the resources of the parents.

Secondly, the means of all beyond a certain pe-
riod of life would exceed the amount requisite for
the necessary maintenance of themselves and fa-
milies, and they would of course employ the ex-
cess in procuring conveniences and comforts.
These conveniences and comforts they would en-
joy in common with their children, who, were

IMMMi

they to separate themselves from their father's fa-
mily without an adequate independency, would be
immediately obliged to forego many enjoyments
to which they had been accustomed, and to which
habit would have given, in their estimation, almost
the character of necessaries. This circumstance,
though in itself apparently of less importance than
a positive inability to maintain a family, would
perhaps of the two have the greatest influence on
the conduct. Quitting a comfortable home in-
volves consequences obvious and immediate. The
difficulty of maintaining a future family is distant
and uncertain. But distant futurity, like a distant
object, is diminished to our perceptions ; and sel-
dom sufficiently awakens our fears, or fixes our
attention.

Both the benefits, which I have mentioned, have
depended on an increase of the external motives.
A third, connected chiefly with the disposition to
prudence, is as follows :

The younger members of society receiving from
their parents so many more benefits than the chil-
dren of the lower classes receive at present, and
being also actually dependent on them in much

e 3

greater degree, would find themselves under a
greater necessity of consulting them with regard
to their own plans and views of interest, of re-
specting their feelings, and of being guided by
their advice. In nothing is this influence more
likely to be beneficial than in the particular of
marriage. This proposition I will explain in the
following manner.

Generally speaking, prudence, or the habit of
attending to future consequences, is a virtue sel-
dom acquired in any great degree of perfection
until late in life. It is the result of long observa-
tion and repeated experience. It is acquired, first
in respect of cases of which the consequences are
near, or which are of frequent recurrence, and not
until long afterwards in respect of cases of which
the consequences are remote and indistinct, or
which recur but seldom.

The magnitude also of an effort of prudence is
evidently proportional to the extent of the present
sacrifice. For example, in a question about mar-
riage, the effort of prudence, when successful, is
greater in proportion as the passion is stronger.
The power however of discerning the necessity

for such an effort, and consequently cateris pari-
bus the probability of its being made, seems to
vary inversely in this proportion. The human
eye is incapable of taking a clear view of many
objects at once. When it is intently fixed on one
object, all other objects are necessarily overlooked.
In like manner, the mind can only attend at one
time to a definite number of considerations : and
it follows, that, where the thoughts and feelings
are deeply engaged on a present benefit, little
power of attention remains to be bestowed upon
the future.

Now, in these elements, essential to the pru-
dential disposition, the young are deficient, and
hence there is a necessity for the cooperation of
different persons, upon the principle of a divi-
sion of labour, in the arrangement of a marriage.
The old should take the prudential department.
They alone have the necessary experience, and,
what is of still more importance, they alone have
their minds serene, and unimpeded by the mists
and clouds of present passion. But this coopera-
tion can only have place where the young are un-
der the influence of the old; and they cannot be in
any sufficient degree under this influence, un-

less trained by habitual dependence to defer to
the advice and direction of their parents. I
am here speaking of influence properly so call-
ed, and not of authority, namely, the influence
arising from benefits received, continued, and ex-
pected.

Suppose this influence established. Another
consequence may be observed which will follow
collaterally from the same cause. The same de-
pendence which generates the influence, is also
calculated to increase the watchfulness and anxiety
of parents. In proportion to the dependence of
children, is the degree in which the thoughts of
their parents are necessarily engaged in their be-
half, and again in proportion to this degree is the
force of habit, and of other causes which tend
to continue the thoughts and feelings in the same
channel. On this ground I think, that, were a
friend or relation to relieve a parent of the burden
of maintaining his child from the age of seven to
that of one and twenty, the probable consequence
would be, that the parent would not afterwards
feel the same interest in that child as he would
otherwise have felt.

If this conclusion be just, it must be equally so

in all cases in which a parent is in fact dis-
charged of the maintenance of his child, whatever
Yye the way in which the discharge is effected. It
will hold good therefore in the case, in which
children are able, from an early age, to purchase
their maintenance by their own labour. When
that happens, it is to be expected that in the sea-
son of youth they will be left in a great measure
to their own thoughtlessness and natural impru-
dence. Even supposing them, for argument's sake,
to be open to influence, that is, to be fully ready
to be guided by advice properly given, they will
be without advisers. I say they will be without
advisers, because, though advice in one sense is al-
ways cheap,, yet they will be without friends, who
will so far interest themselves in their welfare,
as to watch the occasions in which advice is re-
quired, and to take the pains and trouble, of in-
vestigating facts, and of acquiring the knowledge
which can alone render them competent, to advise
with judgment, to support their advice with suffi-
cient reasons, or to weigh properly the objections
which may be made to it. On this ground there-
fore, as well as on the ground of the influence

produced by it, a long dependence of children on
their parents is favourable to that element of the
preventive check which I termed the prudential
disposition.

It may be useful here to mention that the two
consequences which I have been considering, may
be readily distinguished in the memory, by re-
ferring the one to the children and the other to
the parents. The same cause disposes the chil-
dren to receive with deference the opinions of
their parents, and the parents to take the pains
necessary for forming correct opinions as to all
that concerns the welfare and prosperity of their
children.

I here quit the abstract hypothesis, or at least
the abstract consideration of it. The remainder
of the Lecture will be occupied with the applica-
tion of it, and with some general remarks upon
the existing state of society, and the principles
upon which it may be improved.

I have explained, that, to the preventive check
two elements are necessary, namely, motives for
prudence, and a prudential disposition; the mo-
tives being distinguished as depending on external

causes, and the disposition, for contradistinction,
t>eing referred to the minds of the individuals.
"We have seen that, under the hypothesis of which
I treated in the last Lecture, both these elements
are deficient, but under that of which I have just
concluded the examination, they are present in
considerable force. Now, the former hypothesis,
as I have already intimated, corresponds very
nearly with the actual condition of the labouring
classes in this country. The latter, in like man-
ner, corresponds with that of persons engaged
either in the learned professions, or in those other
arts, in which the excellency of the product de-
pends rather on mental, than on bodily attain-
ments. And, though it corresponds solely with
that of these persons, according to the strictness of
the terms in which it is expressed, yet, substan-
tially and in effect, it corresponds with that of all
the higher and middling classes of society. For
the conclusions do not depend on the mode by
which, an increased income is acquired with the
advance of life, but, solely and simply, on the cir-
cumstance of the command of wealth residing
chiefly with the old, without reference to the
source from which that command is obtained.

The problem to be solved relates to the manner
in which the possession of the world may be best
secured to its existing occupants, and the entrance
guarded, so that those who are already seated,
and have but just elbow-room, may limit the ad-
missions, and exclude the crowd which is pressing
at the doors. At nature's mighty feast, to use
an expression of Mr. Malthus, there should be no
free sittings. The first comers should have, each
a box appropriated to himself, into which alone he
should be at liberty to introduce others. Now,
the old are the first comers into the world, and
with them, therefore, the right of disposing of its
food should chiefly reside. This would be the
case, did they possess, either exclusively or prin-
cipally, the power of labouring. But it is also
equally the case, where, for the deficiency of the
power of labouring, there is an adequate sub-
stitute, in income derived either from capital
or from property in land. The unborn, when
they come to be born, bring with them a pair
of hands, which will soon become competent to
labour. Capital cannot be acquired until long
after. The possession of landed property depends
upon succession. It continues to the end of life,

and must therefore in general be accumulated with
the old.

Mr. Malthus, in describing the prevalence of
the preventive check in England, observes, that
** the sons of tradesmen and farmers are exhorted
not to marry, and generally find it necessary to
comply with this advice, till they are settled in
some business or farm which may enable them
to support a family." " These events," he ftu>
ther remarks, " may not perhaps occur until they
u are far advanced in life."

Observe now the principle, to which, in the
case of these persons, he refers the operation of
the preventive check. It is clearly their state of
dependence. The sons of labourers are them-
selves, suojure 9 labourers. But the sons of trades-
men and farmers are the sons of tradesmen and
farmers, and nothing more. They are not them-
selves tradesmen and farmers. Hence their pru-
dence is described as an effect of exhortation, and
not of the original workings of their own minds.
They are dependent on others who are interested
in their welfare, and who through this depend-
ence have a powerful influence over them.

I have already observed, that the uncertain-

ties and variations of employment are unfavour-
able to the preventive check among labourers. I
may now add, that the same want of precedency,
and the scramble which prevails in the whole
business of commercial life, is, pro tanto, equally
unfavourable to it among the middling classes.
The sons of tradesmen and farmers are exhorted
not to marry until they are settled in some busi-
ness or farm. Let us suppose them uniformly to
comply with this advice. Then, the rapidity of
succession, which will regulate the number of
marriages, will be proportional, not simply to
the vacancies by death, and the increase of the
resources of the society, but, to the sum of these,
together with the number of unsuccessful specu-
lations : since every failure must make room for a
new adventurer. Hence, in proportion to the
number of failures is the excess of marriages, and
in the same proportion is the constitution of so-
ciety deficient, in respect of the motives for moral
restraint, which it ought to present to individuals.
This is of course to be understood, on the suppo-
sition of there being no compensation in some
other particular.

One great point with respect to the preventive

rfieck is a motive for procrastination, and this can
only be looked for in the assured prospect of an
advance in circumstances with the advance in age.
-A curate, who is without hopes of further ad-
vancement, settles his mind to his condition, and
marries at once upon his curacy. But, if he has
reasonable expectation of preferment, he is apt to
• feed himself with hope, and, raising his ideas of
comfort, and of the rank in society which he
would wish his wife and family to hold, to the
standard of his future prospects, to postpone his
marriage until these prospects can be realized:
The same principles are calculated equally to ope-
rate throughout all ranks of society 11 .

h A point of difference, which has not been expressly noticed
in the Lecture, between the labouring and the other classes of
society, unfavourable to prudential motives among the former,
is the following :

Among labourers, it is an actual family only, and not the
mere state of matrimony, which occasions any considerable
expense. They have no servants or establishment to main-
tain. And, as to their own maintenance, now that females are
so much employed, the husband and the wife commonly earn
it, independently of each other, or nearly so, as in the single
state. They have indeed to pay house-rent ; but, when sin-
gle, they not unfrequently have to pay for lodging, even while
living with their parents. Thus the expense, which marriage

That the prudential disposition in human nature
is sufficiently strong, where the constitution of so-
ciety distributes, and fixes properly, the obligation
to prudence, is evident from the example of Nor-
way, which, though ranking among the least civi-
lized nations of Europe, is yet that, in which, un-
less perhaps we except Switzerland, the preventive
check prevails in the highest degree. " The Nor-
way farms 1 have in general a certain number of
married labourers employed upon them, in pro-
portion to their size, who are called housemen.
" They receive from the farmer a house and a
quantity of land, nearly sufficient to maintain a
family, in return for which they are under an ob-
" ligation qf working for him at a low price, when-
ever they are called upon. Except in the imme-
diate neighbourhood of the towns, and on the sea-
coast, the vacancy of a place of this kind is the
only prospect which presents itself of providing-

«<

€€

entails on them, is future and contingent. But in all other
ranks, the expense depending on marriage, is great, imme-
diate, and certain. The husband also has commonly alone
to contribute the most considerable part of it.

* Malthus on Population. Chapter on the checks to popu-
lation in Norway.

'* for a family ;" and, in consequence, the young men
and women remain with the farmer as unmarried
servants, and forming part of his household, till a
iiouseman's place becomes vacant. Thus the con-
dition of unmarried labourers, and their hope of
succession to a houseman's place, is analogous to
fellowships and succession to livings in this uni-
versity. A houseman's place is in the nature of
a benefice. This simple constitution seems to
secure the efficacy of the preventive check in
nearly the full degree which nature requires. On
the sea-coast, however, which furnishes hopes of
an adequate supply of food from fishing, a source
of subsistence possessed in common, prudential re-
straint is much less prevalent. And there, accord-
ingly, the people are very poor and wretched, and
beyond comparison in a worse state than the pea-
sants in the interior of the country k .

k Dr. Chalmers considers, that fewer and later marriages
will be the slow but sure product of education working on the
habits and inclinations of the common people, and begetting
a higher cast of character, and a higher standard of enjoy-
ment; whence be tells us, that, as in Norway, we may expect
to behold the cheerful spectacle of a thriving, independent, and
respectable peasantry (p. 552). Education is beyond all ques-
tion of great importance. It does not however appear, as a

<4
«

It is probable, that the obligation to moral
straint was better distributed in England a hun-
dred years ago than it is at present. " It is sel-
" dom," says Swift, writing in 1737, and comparing
the condition of Ireland with that of England,
" it is seldom known in England, that the Ia-
" bourer, the lower mechanic, the servant or the
cottager, thinks of marrying, until he hath
saved up a stock of money sufficient to cany on
" his business ; nor takes a wife without a suitable
" portion ; and as seldom fails of making an yearly
" addition to that stock with the view of providing
" for his children. But in this kingdom, the case
" is directly contrary, where many thousand cou-
ples are yearly married, whose united fortunes,
bating the rags on their backs, would not be
" sufficient to purchase a pint of buttermilk for
their wedding supper, nor have any prospect of
supporting their honourable state, but by ser-
vice, or labour, or thievery."

matter of fact, that the Norwegian peasantry possess any su-
perior advantages with respect to education : while the high
prevalence of the preventive check among them is sufficiently
accounted for by the obvious circumstances peculiar to their
condition, which have been above explained.

It is observable that Swift here speaks of la-
bour, by which he means the sale of labour, as a
source of income, on which alone a labourer ought
not to rely in venturing upon marriage. Hence
it seems reasonable to infer, that in bis time the
number of small capitals, small properties, or small
holdings of land, all of which would operate in
the nature of a houseman's place in Norway 1 , was
much greater, in proportion to the population,
than at present, and extended, perhaps, to the great

1 With respect to small holdings, see note in p. 391 to
which it may be added, that the reasons there given were ap-
plicable in greater force a hundred years ago than at present.
Tne difference arises, partly from the various laws, to facili-
tate the recovery of rent, which have been passed during the
last century, and partly, from the circumstance, that the cost
of verification is necessarily greater, in proportion, in small
than in large holdings.

Small holdings, however, of land, the property of another,
at a low rent, if in the hands of persons naturally inclined to
indolence, are apt to foster and perpetuate it. Not being
saleable as property, they cannot be squandered : but, being
valuable in possession, they will be retained so long as a bare
existence can be supported. Were they held in actual pro-
perty, and saleable, they would soon pass into the hands of the
industrious, and their late indolent owners, who had been in-
sensible to any less powerful motive, would be compelled to
exertion by the stimulus of necessity.
F 2

majority of the labouring families. These were
calculated to secure to their then possessors their
places in the world, and to give them the advan-
tage in the competition against new comers, who
might otherwise have forced them from their posi-
tions. Without, however, building too much upon
the presumption of the accuracy of Swift's expres-
sions, we may observe generally, that the whole
statement is strong ; and certainly, far too strong,
to allow us to believe it to have been made with-
out more foundation, than the present condition of
the English labourer would furnish.

The revolution in manufactures, by which small
capitalists have been thrust out of the market, the
accumulation of farms, which in agriculture has
produced a similar effect, the decay of monopolies,
and the increased productiveness of land, with the
consequent advance of population, while the right
of primogeniture has maintained nearly a station-
ary condition, or has perhaps caused even a retro-
gradation in the number of the landed proprietors,
— all these causes™ have vastly altered the propor-

m To which may be added the progress of inclosures, for
two reasons : first, because no benefit can be derived from

tions of society since the time of Swift, and pro-
duced an immense accumulation in the labouring
class. I here mean the labouring class strictly so
called ; not including in it all who labour, but those
only who live by the sale of their labour without
any other source of income.

Moreover, in manufactures, the motives to pru-
dential restraint, which, among labourers, as we
have already seen, are at all times weak, have been
still further weakened by the extended use of ma-
chinery, which, by performing those parts of ope-
rations requiring mere force, has opened a wider
field for the employment of women and children,
thereby, in a great measure, relieving the head of
a family of the burden of its maintenance. In
agriculture, the poor laws, as they have been admi-
nistered during the last thirty-five years, have ab-
sorbed almost the whole of this burden : so that

a common, except from the possession of capital, in the form
of a cow, or other live stock ; and secondly, because the newly
inclosed lands have been added to the estates of previous pro-
prietors, whence, while population has been increased by the
extension of cultivation, there has not, so far, at least, as this
cause is concerned, been any corresponding increase in the
class of proprietors.

nearly the only portion of a prudential motive,
which now remains to the agricultural labourer,
is to be found in the difficulty of obtaining a house,
and accumulating a little money to buy furniture.

Meanwhile, the progress of medicine, the in-
creased healthiness of the country, through the
destruction of the woods, the draining of marshes,
the improvements in the police of cities, and their
better ventilation, all tending to the prolongation of
life generally, and especially to the preservation of
infant life, render the necessity for moral restraint
more urgent and intense than ever.

Let me, however, not be understood, as repro-
bating manufactures, or machinery, or the accu-
mulation of farms, but only as noticing some evil,
though certainly very serious, consequences, which
are mingled with the good, as is commonly the
case in all human affairs. I consider even infant
schools, notwithstanding their acknowledged ex-
cellency in respect of their primary and obvious
effects, to be liable to the same objection. The
relief they give to mothers, must, infallibly, in the
long run, be turned to the increase of labour, and
the increase of the competition for food, since it is

certain that there is no other limit to that
competition, than the inability, on the part of the
most wretched, to increase their biddings. A long
Ltalogue of evils might indeed be enumerated.
>ut I see no reason for believing any of them in-
superable, and I have no doubt but that the pro-
gress of political science will in time discover a re-
medy for most.

The common reasons for the establishment of
private property in land are deduced from the ne-
cessity, of offering to individuals sufficient motives
for cultivating the ground, and of preventing the
wasteful destruction of the immature products of
the earth. But to these there is another added,
by the theory of population, from which we infer,
that, since the earth can never maintain all who can
offer themselves for maintenance, it is better that
its produce should be divided into shares of a defi-
nite magnitude, sufficient each for the comfortable
maintenance of a family, whence the number of fa-
milies to be maintained would be determined from
the number of such shares, than that all, who can
possibly enter, should be first admitted, and then
the magnitude of each share be determined from
the number of admissions.

In the present state of society, down to a certain
point, the food is distributed in definite shares.
Beyond that point, that is, amongst those whose
necessities press against their means, it is divided
proportionally to their numbers. That the owners
of land should be able to command definite shares,
is a necessary consequence of their ownership. Be-
tween them, as purchasers of food, there can be no
competition. Among capitalists, and the rest of
the middling ranks, the same result follows, only
contingently, from the limitation of their com-
petition. Were capital as uniformly distributed,
and as easily obtained, as is the ability to labour,
then, however great its efficacy in assisting la-
bour might be, still the capitalists would be as
badly off as are at present the labouring classes.
Capital would be in a manner absorbed into la-
bour, and the possession of it would be equiva-
lent merely to an increased effectiveness of labour.
The labourers would indeed be better clothed,
better lodged, and all their artificial wants would
be more liberally supplied. But leisure they
would not have, nor would they obtain the means
of subsistence upon easier terms than at present.

If the incomes of a certain number of families,

not exceeding that which the food of the country
can well maintain, be greater than those of the
remainder, then, amongst those families, the com-
petition would be sufficiently limited, and they
might all live in comfort and comparative afflu-
ence, notwithstanding inequalities in their con-
ditions, and although their numbers might ap-
proach to the utmost amount which the food of
the country could maintain upon a liberal allow-
ance. Supposing, for example, the income de-
rivable from the sale of the labour of a family to
be fifty pounds per annum, then, were as many,
or nearly as many families as the food of the
country could well maintain, but not a greater
number, to possess, in addition to their labour,
other sources of income, derived either from capi-
tal or from land, these families, in the compe-
tition for food, would drive all other families out
of the market, and a due proportion would be
preserved between the population and the food".

n On the supposition of the abilities of all to labour being
accurately equal, and not only equal as between person and
person, but also in the case of the same person uniform and
permanent, the smallest excess of income above mere wages

And it is evident that, according to the certainty
and regularity of succession to these advantages,
that is, according to the degree in which it could
be calculated and foreseen, they would enter into
human motives, and form incentives to moral
restraint.

Wealth is productive of many other beneficial
consequences besides such as are intended and de-
sired by those who seek it. For the sake of
those consequences, inequality of conditions is
necessary, on account of its effect in creating new
and powerful stimulants to exertion, which the
natural utility of wealth, considered merely in
reference to the primary gratifications resulting
from its use, would be utterly insufficient to pro-
duce. After the necessary wants have been sup-
plied, the next powerful motive to exertion is the
spirit of emulation, and the desire of rising in the
world. Men are attracted upwards by the ex-
ample of others who are richer than themselves.
At the top of the scale this attraction is wanting.

would be sufficient for the purpose. In proportion to the in-
accuracy of the supposition, the necessary excess would be-
come greater, as in proportion to the violence of storms is
the amount of ballast which a ship must carry.

At that point, therefore, it is necessary that there
should be a title to wealth without the labour of
producing it. A state of perfect equality, by its
effect in lowering the standard of desire, and
almost reducing it to the satisfaction of the natu-
ral necessities, would bring back society to igno-
rance and barbarism. Still, the same principle of
population, which furnishes a reason for the insti-
tution of property, prescribes a limit to its con-
centration. To a plank in the sea, which cannot
support all, all have not an equal right ; the lucky
individuals, who can first obtain possession, being
justified in appropriating it to themselves, to the
exclusion of the remainder. Where property is
much concentrated, and where, by consequence,
the class of mere labourers is great, the principle
of population would warrant the application of
the same argument, to justify the appropriation
of the field of employment, and a monopoly of
labour. But, since such a monopoly is not easily
maintainable, we are led to look for an equivalent
in the diffusion of a sufficient degree of property
throughout the whole fabric of society.

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Full text of "Two lectures on the checks to population"

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